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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether the threshold beyond which a public debt change 
may have a detrimental effect on economic growth changes across euro area countries during the 
1961-2015 period. In contrast with previous studies, we do not use panel estimation techniques, but 
implement a time-series analysis for each country based on the growth literature. The results suggest 
that in all the countries but Belgium a debt increase begins to have detrimental effects on growth 
well before the SGP debt ceiling (a debt ratio of around 40% and 50% in central and peripheral 
countries, respectively) is reached. So, although austerity policies should be applied in EMU 
countries – since according to our results debt reduction barely exerts any significant beneficial 
impact on EMU countries’ growth – they should be accompanied by structural reforms that can 
increase their potential GDP. Moreover, as our results suggest that the harmful impact of a debt 
change on growth does not occur beyond the same threshold and with the same intensity in all 
EMU countries, a focus on average ratios and impacts may be unsuitable for defining policies. 
Specifically, our findings suggest that the pace of fiscal adjustment should be lower in Greece and 
Spain than in the other countries. 
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“At the present stage of development in Economics it is probably an advantage to have 
different groups looking at the same problem from different viewpoints, so that their 
conclusions can be compared and possibly then form the basis for a new compressive model”  
Granger (1990, 1) 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Nine years after the onset of the Great Recession, recovery remains tepid and bumpy in the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and the prospects remain uncertain. 
The recent economic crisis led to an unprecedented increase in public debt across euro area 
countries1, raising serious concerns about its impact after a debt crisis that even called into 
question the stability of the euro. Troubled sovereign borrowers received financial rescue 
packages which were conditional on fiscal austerity and on the implementation of structural 
reforms to improve competitiveness.  
In the light of the events of the last few years, there is widespread agreement about the 
potentially adverse consequences for the economies of EMU countries of their unparalleled 
levels of public debt. However, few macroeconomic policy debates have generated as much 
controversy as the current austerity argument [see Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Alesina et al. 
(2015), Guajardo et al. (2011) or Jordà and Taylor (2016)] and, as Europe stagnates, the 
disagreement appears to be far from over. The core of the debate revolves around 
identifying the right stabilization policies to implement or, in a context of low economic 
growth, establishing the right pace of adjustment: austerity measures may prove positive in 
the long run, but they are likely to have negative effects on demand and production during 
the adjustment period [see Cottarelli and Jaramillo (2013), Delong and Summers (2012), or 
Perotti (2012)].  
Overall, the theoretical literature finds that there is cause to take into account the effects of 
very high debt on capital stock and growth, since it tends to point to a negative link 
between the public debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio and the steady-state 
growth rate of GDP (see, for instance, Aizenman et al., 2007). The conventional view is 
that while debt can stimulate aggregate demand and output in the short run [see Barro 
(1990) or Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)], in the long run it may crowd out capital and 
                                                 
1 On average, public debt reached levels about 100% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – its highest level in 50 years – 
by the end of 2013. 
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reduce output (Salotti and Trecroci, 2016). Moreover, the literature provides a variety of 
reasons to explain why the higher the level of public debt, the more negative its effects. 
Greiner (2014) points out that growth-impeding long-run effects are caused by changes in 
market participants’ expectations at high levels of public debt, leading to an increase in 
interest rates and a decrease in investment; Teles and Mussolini (2014) stress that, as 
uncertainty rises, additional fiscal flexibility for productive government spending is 
reduced, with a negative effect on growth; whilst Cochrane (2011) emphasizes that the 
higher the levels of public debt, the greater their negative effects due to a climate of 
uncertainty in which economic actors expect future confiscation, in the form of either 
increasing inflation or distortionary taxation.  
Against this background, the analysis in this paper will focus on the short-run effects of 
debt changes on economic growth in EMU countries with the objective to bring some light 
to the current austerity debate in a context of unprecedented debt levels. Therefore, we 
pose the following research questions: Does the effect of changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
on the short-run growth rate depend on the level of debt and the sign of the debt change? 
What is the debt-to-GDP threshold beyond which expansionary fiscal policies (a debt 
increase) have a negative impact on euro area economies’ rates of growth? Does the short-
term effect of a debt variation on economic performance differ across euro area countries? 
If a heterogeneous nexus between debt and growth is found, should stabilization policies to 
consolidate public finances or the pace of adjustment within euro area countries differ?  
These are important policy questions that need to be answered, but the results from the 
empirical literature in the EMU context do not provide a conclusive response since, despite 
the severe sovereign debt crisis, few papers have examined the relationship between debt 
and growth for euro area countries and the scant literature so far has mostly disregarded 
country heterogeneity in this relationship. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) analyse 
the empirics of the debt-growth nexus using a standard growth model and panel data 
techniques and find that, during the 1970-2008 period, the turning point beyond which 
government debt negatively affects growth is 90-100% of GDP. Baum et al. (2013), who 
focused on the 1990-2010 period, detected a similar threshold by employing a dynamic 
approach (while the short-run impact of debt on per capita GDP growth is positive and 
significant, it decreases to zero beyond debt-to-GDP ratios of 67%, and at ratios above 
95% additional debt has a negative impact on output growth). In contrast, Dreger and 
Reimers (2013)’s analysis is based on the distinction between sustainable and non-
sustainable debt periods. Their results show that the negative impact of the debt-to-GDP 
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ratio on growth in the euro area is limited to periods of non-sustainable public debt; 
instead, debt will exert a positive impact on growth given that it is sustainable. The three 
former studies are synthesized and extended by Antonakakis (2014). Like them he uses a 
panel approach, but in addition to debt non-linearities he also examines the role of debt 
sustainability in economic growth in the euro area.  
Overall, the empirical literature mentioned above supports the presence of a common debt 
threshold across (similar) countries like those in the euro area favouring that so far the 
policy debate mostly ignored country heterogeneity in fiscal rules implementation.  
However, on the one hand, some recent literature has stressed that the effects of fiscal 
consolidation on economic activity, not only differ between core and peripheral countries 
(Anderson et al., 2014), but also across peripheral economies (Aldici et al., 2016). On the 
other hand, the latest literature on the debt-growth relationship suggests that the presence 
of a tipping point does not mean that it has to be common across countries.  
Indeed, the review paper by Panizza and Presbitero (2013) triggered a new wave of studies 
analysing the heterogeneous growth effects of public debt2. According to Mitze and Matz 
(2015), whilst a “first generation” of empirical cross-country studies predominantly 
predicted an inverted U-shape relationship between public debt and economic growth, with 
a negative impact on growth particularly in highly indebted countries, more recently a 
“second generation” of empirical contributions has challenged those findings on various 
grounds, including uncontrolled sample heterogeneity. The “first generation” of papers 
include the works by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Pattillo et al. (2011), Lof and Malinen 
(2014) and Woo and Kumar (2015); whilst the “second generation” include Ghosh et al. 
(2013), Markus and Rainer (2016), Chudik et al. (2017), Pescatori et al. (2014) or  
Edberhardt and Presbitero (2015).  
The latter authors propose a variety of reasons for the heterogeneity across countries in the 
debt-growth nexus. Ghosh et al. (2013) show that the turning point may be a function of 
countries’ structural characteristics and GDP growth. Markus and Rainer (2016) point out 
that, due to specific institutional characteristics concerning fiscal flexibility, fiscal 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), who investigate the debt-growth relationship in 118 developing, emerging 
and advanced economies and find some evidence for nonlinearity, but state that there is no evidence at all for a common 
threshold level in all countries over time; Égert (2015), who presents empirical evidence suggesting that 90% (the 
threshold suggested in the seminal paper by Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) is not a magic number since it may be lower and 
nonlinearity may change across different samples and specifications, or Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2015), who 
examine the bi-directional causality between debt and growth in a sample of eleven EMU countries and find that public 
debt has a negative effect over growth from an endogenously determined breakpoint and above a debt threshold that 
differs depending on the country.  
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effectiveness and fiscal consistency, different economic systems entail different degrees of 
fiscal uncertainty, which to a large extent shape the investment climate at comparable levels 
of public debt and thus constitute a source of heterogeneity in the relationship between 
high public debt levels and long-run economic growth. Chudik et al. (2017) and Pescatori et 
al. (2014) identify the debt trajectory as a source of heterogeneity in the debt-growth 
relationship, suggesting that high but falling public debt levels are growth-neutral while 
high and rising debt levels are detrimental for economic activity. Finally, according to 
Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), there are many possible reasons for the differences in the 
relationships between public debt and growth across countries. First, production 
technology may differ across countries, and thus also the relationship between debt and 
growth. Second, the capacity to tolerate high levels of debt may depend on a number of 
country-specific characteristics, related to past crises and the macro and institutional 
framework. Third, vulnerability to public debt may depend not only on levels of debt, but 
also on its composition (domestic versus external, foreign or domestic currency-
denominated, long-term versus short-term public debt), which may also differ significantly 
across countries. 
Nevertheless, our study of the empirical evidence revealed hardly any analyses of the 
potential heterogeneity in the debt-growth nexus across euro area countries since the scarce 
literature on this topic belongs to the “first generation” of papers. Thus, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to examine explicitly whether the debt-growth 
relationship may differ across EMU countries depending on their particular idiosyncrasies. 
The study of whether the relationship between public debt and economic growth may vary 
across countries has a significant bearing in the euro area context because, if the impact of 
debt on growth differs according to country, a focus on the average relation may be 
misleading for the definition of policy in individual countries –especially in an environment 
in which some EMU countries are already obliged to apply adjustment plans that re-
establish competitiveness and fiscal balance.  
Hence, this paper aims to fill the existing gap in the literature by explicitly taking into 
account the possible heterogeneity in the relationship between debt and growth across euro 
area countries. Our paper, then, is closely related to the work by Eberhardt and Presbitero 
(2015) and covers a very similar period but, in contrast with their analysis, it centres on the 
short-run effects of debt on economic growth, focuses on a different sample of countries 
and applies a different methodology. Whereas those authors used total public debt data 
from 118 developing, emerging and advanced economies, we centre on 11 euro area 
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countries. And with regard to the econometric methodology, instead of using panel 
estimation techniques that allow for heterogeneous limits across countries, we explore the 
time series dimension of the issue to obtain further evidence based on the historical 
experience of each country in the sample in order to detect potential heterogeneities in the 
relationship across euro area countries. In so doing, by taking into consideration the 
stationary or non-stationary nature of the variables under study, we can properly use 
hypothesis tests to examine the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the rationale for our 
empirical approach on the basis of the results of some preliminary descriptive analyses. 
Section 3 introduces the analytical framework. Section 4 describes the data used in the 
analysis. Empirical results are presented in Section 5 and some extensions are incorporated 
in order to explore the possibility of asymmetric effects and to identify threshold effects. 
Finally, some concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in Section 6.  
2. Preliminary descriptive analysis 
In the following, we provide some descriptive analyses highlighting the cross-country 
heterogeneity in the relationship between debt and growth in euro area countries. Figure 1 
shows the evolution of net sovereign debt-to-GDP and real GDP per capita growth in the 
11 countries in our sample (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) over the sample period 1961-2015.   
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Some interesting insights can be drawn from Figure 1, which shows that the debt-to-GDP 
ratio reached its peak at the end of the sample period in all the countries in our sample, 
with the exceptions of Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands where the highest ratio 
coincided with the economic crisis of the early 1990s. So, leaving these three countries 
aside, the recent economic and financial crisis led to an unprecedented increase in public 
debt-to-GDP ratios in the majority of EMU countries, even though their evolution over 
the 1961-2015 period exhibits different patterns. While in Ireland, Italy and Spain the 
notable rise in debt accumulation in 2007-2008 was preceded by a deleverage period; in 
Austria, France, Germany, Greece and Portugal debt presented an upward trend 
throughout the period, albeit at different speeds. With respect to GDP growth, although 
the evolution of the business cycle is quite similar in all EMU countries, the impact of the 
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recessions (five according to the CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee3: 
1974:Q4-1975:Q1; 1980:Q2-1983:Q3; 1992:Q2-1993:Q3; 2008:Q2-2009:Q2; and 2011:Q4-
2013:Q3) clearly diverges across countries. 
All in all, Figure 1 indicates that the evolution of the two variables studied (net public debt-
to-GDP and GDP per capita growth) presents very different patterns across euro area 
countries. This suggests that an individual analysis of their relationship over time may 
capture the potential heterogeneity across countries and provide more useful information 
than a country-group analysis applying panel techniques.   
Obviously, the above results are by no means conclusive, but they may challenge some of 
the implicit assumptions adopted in most of the previous literature regarding the 
relationship between debt and growth in similar countries, like those in the euro area. They 
thus provide a good reason to examine whether there may be some differences in this 
relationship across EMU countries depending on their level of economic development, 
their industrial structure, or the institutional environment.  
3. Analytical framework 
Economic models are inevitably incomplete characterizations of the complicated reality of 
economic life: “like rays of light they illuminate a part of a whole and leave the rest in dark” 
Hicks (1981, p.232). Therefore, formulating a sufficiently general initial model to capture all 
the substantively relevant influences is a fundamental problem facing all empirical 
modelling exercises (Doornik and Hendry, 2015). 
The crucial decision in all empirical studies concerns the set of variables for which 
observations should be collected and then analysed, which will be a small subset of all the 
variables in the economy. Following both the relevant economic theory and the previous 
empirical results, our strategy incorporates the specification and estimation of a growth 
equation based on the growth literature (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) augmented by 
public debt to assess whether the latter has an impact on growth over and above other 
determinants. 
The initial empirical specification is derived from the neoclassical growth model of Solow, 
where the growth rate of real per capita GDP (gt) for a given country is: 
                                                 
3 The CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee establishes the chronology of recessions and expansions of the 
eleven original euro area member countries plus Greece for 1970-1998, and of the euro area as a whole from 1999 
onwards (see Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2014). 
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                                      1
1
n
t t i it t t
i
g y X dα γ δ β ε−
=
= + + + +∑    (1) 
where yt-1 is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP (to capture the “catch-up effect” or 
conditional convergence of the economy to its steady state), Xit (i=1, …, n) is a set of 
explanatory regressors and dt is the net public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Regarding Xt, we consider a set of explanatory variables that have been shown to be 
consistently associated with growth in the literature: population growth rate as a percentage 
(POPGRt); the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP (GCFt); life expectancy at birth, a 
proxy for the level of human capital (HKt)4; openness to trade, measured by the absolute 
sum of exports and imports over GDP (OPENt); and the GDP deflator inflation rate, a 
measure of macroeconomic instability and uncertainty (INFt). 
In the economic growth literature, the rate of growth of labour used in the production 
process and the accumulation of physical capital (investment) are the key determinants of 
growth (Solow, 1956 or Frankel, 1962). So, population growth (POPGRt) and the ratio of 
gross fixed capital formation to real GDP (GCFt) are used to proxy country size and the 
rate of labour growth and the accumulation of the physical capital stock respectively. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between population and economic growth 
is mixed and varies between countries. Some empirical studies suggest that the relationship 
is negative and insignificant (Levine and Renelt, 1992); others find a negative and 
significant association (Mankiw et al., 1992); whilst still others present evidence of a positive 
relationship (Sachs and Warner, 1997). The population growth rate, then, has been found 
to exhibit either a positive or a negative relationship with economic growth. However, 
according to many literature reports, a positive and statistically significant impact of 
physical capital stock (investment) on economic growth is expected5.   
A proxy of human capital (HKt) is included to reflect the notion that countries with an 
abundance of human capital are more likely to be able to attract investors, absorb ideas 
from the rest of the world, and engage in innovation activities (Grossman and Helpman, 
                                                 
4 This proxy is also used by Sachs and Warner (1997). Other proxies commonly used for human capital such as years of 
secondary education and school enrollment in secondary were only available from 1980. Additionally, the proxy years of 
secondary education did not change during the sample period. As shown in Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009), 
longer life expectancy encourages human capital accumulation, since a longer time horizon increases the value of 
investments that pay out over time. Moreover, better health and greater education are complementary with longer life 
expectancy (Becker, 2007). Indeed, life expectancy at birth correlates strongly with the index of human capital per person 
provided by the Penn World Table (version 8.0, Feenstra et al., 2013), based on years of schooling (Barro and Lee, 2013) 
and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). 
5 Investment and growth may also be associated through the savings ratio (Keynes, 1936).  
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1991). Whilst some studies have found a positive relationship between human capital and 
economic growth (Radelet et al., 2001), others have found a negative relationship (Barro, 
2003). Consequently, the effect of human capital on economic growth is expected to be 
either positive or negative. Trade openness (OPENt) is posited to boost productivity 
through transfers of knowledge and efficiency gains (Seghezza and Baldwin, 2008). Since 
most of the empirical literature [Romer (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), or Edwards 
(1998), among others] provides evidence of the positive impact of openness on growth, a 
positive sign is expected for this variable. Finally, with regard to the inflation rate (INFt), it 
has been argued that inflation is a good macroeconomic indicator of how the government 
manages the economy [see Fischer (1993) or Barro (2003), among other authors] and that 
low inflation brings about economic efficiency because, through the price mechanism, 
economies are able to allocate scarce resources to their best economic use (World Bank, 
1990). Nonetheless, the a priori expectation may be either a positive or negative association 
between inflation and economic growth. This uncertain a priori effect is supported by the 
different arguments presented in the literature regarding the relationship between these two 
variables. Whilst some authors defend a negative relationship, others support a positive 
one. So, on the one hand, the former group includes De Gregorio (1993), who suggests 
that inflation can increase the cost of capital, reducing capital accumulation and lowering its 
productivity and thus inhibiting long-run growth; Friedman (1977), who conjectures that 
inflation uncertainty would reduce the effectiveness of the price mechanism to coordinate 
economic activities, decreasing the output growth rate; and Fischer (1993) or Bruno and 
Easterly (1998), who stress the negative relationship between inflation and growth 
especially via its impact on the efficiency of physical capital. On the other hand, the latter 
group includes Tobin (1965), who argues that higher anticipated inflation can increase 
capital per head as households shift their (portfolio) assets away from real money balances 
(non-interest-bearing money) toward real capital (more productive forms) and Dotsey and 
Sarte (2000), who contend that inflation makes the return to money balances uncertain and 
reduces the demand for real money balances and consumption; this increases precautionary 
savings and, in response to higher anticipated inflation, the investment pool enhances 
economic growth. 
4. Data  
We use annual data for eleven EMU countries: both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
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Spain)6. We use long spans of data covering the 1961-2015 period (i.e., a total of 54 annual 
observations) to explore the dimension of historical specificity and to capture the 
underlying relationship between the variables under study. 
To maintain as much homogeneity as possible for a sample of 11 countries over the course 
of five decades, we use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators7 as our primary 
source. We then strengthen our data with the use of supplementary information from the 
International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics and World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016) and the European Commission´s AMECO database. As 
mentioned above, we use per capita GDP at 2010 market prices, population growth rate, 
the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP, an index of human capital, openness to trade 
and GDP deflator inflation. The precise definitions and sources of the variables are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
5. Empirical Results8 
5.1. Time series properties 
Our approach focuses on time series analyses of yearly data for individual countries which 
can help us to document the possible differences in their experiences. This approach is 
likely to provide an accurate idea of what underlies the debt-growth nexus in EMU 
countries. 
Since the appropriate econometric treatment of a model depends crucially on the pattern of 
stationarity and non-stationarity of the variables under study, before carrying out the 
estimation we test for the order of integration of the variables by means of the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. This step is necessary to ensure that all our variables in the 
regression equation have the same order of integration, given the non-stationarity that most 
macroeconomic data exhibit. The results decisively reject the null hypothesis of unit root at 
conventional significance levels for gt, INFt, POPGRt and GCFt (indicating that they are 
                                                 
6 This distinction between European central and peripheral countries has been used extensively in the empirical literature. 
The two groups we consider roughly correspond to the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) between 
countries whose currencies continuously participated in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from its 
inception and which maintained broadly stable bilateral exchange rates with each other over the sample period, and those 
countries whose currencies either entered the ERM later or suspended their participation in the ERM, as well as 
fluctuating widely in value relative to the Deutschmark. These two groups are also roughly the ones found in Jacquemin 
and Sapir (1996), who applied multivariate analysis techniques to a wide set of structural and macroeconomic indicators, 
to form a homogeneous group of countries. Moreover, these two groups are basically the same as the ones found in 
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005) according to economic agents’ perceptions of the commitment to maintain the exchange 
rate around a central parity in the ERM, and those identified by Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero (2012) using 
cluster analysis when analyzing the permanent and transitory volatilities of EMU sovereign yields. 
7 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
8 We summarize the results by pointing out the main regularities. The reader is asked to browse through Tables 1 to 6 to 
find evidence for particular country of her/his special interest.  
11 
 
stationary in levels, i. e., I(0)), while we do not reject the null for yt, dt, OPENt and HKt 
(suggesting that these variables can be treated as first-difference stationary, i. e., I(1))9. 
Then, following Cheung and Chinn’s (1997) suggestion, we confirm these results using the 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary process against the 
alternative of a unit root10. As can be seen in Figure 1 the growth rates are clearly stationary 
I(0), whereas dt appears to be I(1), highlighting the point made above. 
5.2. A basic empirical model 
Given that our dependent variable is stationary (i. e., its statistical properties such as mean, 
variance, autocorrelation, etc. remain constant over time), we cannot explain it with non-
stationary variables (whose statistical properties change over time). Additionally, if the 
variables in the regression model are not stationary, then the standard assumptions for 
asymptotic analysis will not be valid and we cannot undertake hypothesis tests about the 
regression parameters. Therefore, by differencing the non-stationary variables we transform 
them into stationary variables11. 
As a result of the time series properties of our data, the baseline empirical model is as 
follows:  
1 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t t t tg g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF dφ δ δ δ δ δ β ε−= + + ∆ + ∆ + + + ∆ +   (2) 
where Δ denotes the first difference operator.  
Note that model (2) is quite different from model (1), which is commonly used in the 
literature, especially regarding the variables yt-1, HK, OPEN and d, since we find that they 
are non-stationary and therefore enter our model in first differences. As argued in 
Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2016), by rewriting equation (1) as (3) 
1
1 1
l l
s s ns ns
t t i it i it t t
i i
g y X X dα γ δ δ β ε−
= =
= + + + + +∑ ∑      (3) 
(where sitX  and 
ns
itX denote the stationary and non-stationary explanatory variables 
respectively), we can compare (3) with our equation (2), which has 1 1t tg y− −= ∆ instead of 
1ty − , td∆  instead of td  and 
ns
itX∆  instead of 
ns
itX as explanatory variables due to non-
                                                 
9 These results (which are not shown here in order to save space, but are available from the authors upon request) were 
confirmed using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, Rothenberg, and 
Stock (1996) Point Optimal and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity against the alternative of 
high persistence. These additional results are also available from the authors. 
10 The results are not shown here due to space restrictions but are available from the authors upon request. 
11 Note that if the public debt-to-GDP ratio series contains a unit root, that would imply that the results of many previous 
studies (some of which had been used as a basis for policy recommendations) are spurious.  
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stationarity. The interpretation of the estimated parameters is the same in both models, but 
that ofφ , 2 ,δ 3δ and β changes12. 
5.3. Exploring the possibility of asymmetric effects  
To explore the possibility of an asymmetric effect on positive and negative debt variations 
on economic growth for each country, we use the following alternative empirical 
specification to capture this possibility: 
1 1 2 3 4 5
1 2( 0) ( 0)
t t t t t t t
t t t t t
g g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF
d I d d I d
φ δ δ δ δ δ
β β ε
−= + + ∆ + ∆ + +
+ ∆ ∆ > + ∆ ∆ < +
   (4) 
where I is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the condition is fulfilled (i. e., if Δdt 
is positive or negative) and zero otherwise. The indicator function has the effect of splitting 
the debt change variable into two, allowing for its impact to differ depending on the sign of 
the change (i. e., debt accumulation and debt relief).  
We employ a data-based method for obtaining a parsimony representation of the data 
generating process (DGP): the general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 1995). General-to-
specific modelling seeks to mimic reduction by commencing from a general congruent 
specification which is simplified to a minimal representation consistent with the desired 
criteria and the data evidence. Starting from a general unrestricted model that contains all 
the variables likely to be relevant (based on the specification presented in equation 2) and 
lags long enough to be able to capture a constant parameter representation, standard 
testing procedures eliminate statistically-insignificant variables. Diagnostic tests check the 
validity of the reductions, ensuring a consistent final selection which produces a 
parsimonious and interpretable econometric model that is data admissible, presents well-
behaved residuals and uses conditioning variables that are weakly exogenous (see Faust and 
Whiteman, 1997)13. With a judicious choice of parameters and variables this approach 
generates a well-specified model which embeds the economic theory and can deliver the 
parameters of interest14. 
Given the strong potential for endogeneity of the debt variable, especially reverse causation 
(low or negative growth rates of per-capita GDP are likely to induce higher debt burdens), 
                                                 
12 The estimation results for the basic empirical model are not shown here to save space, but they are available from the 
authors upon request. As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the use of the three models could be distracting and 
conflicting.  
13 Phillips (1988) contends that the general-to-specific methodology performs a set of corrections that make it an optimal 
procedure under weak exogeneity. 
14 An impressive record has been built up for the usefulness of empirical model discovery via general-to-specific searches 
(see Hendry, 2000). 
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we use 2SLS (two-stage least squares) instrumental variable techniques to estimate the 
finally selected model. Following the common practice with macroeconomic data, we use 
lagged terms of regressors as instruments15. Panel A in Table 1 reports the results. It can be 
observed that all explanatory variables turn out to be significant and their signs are in 
concordance with the literature. The degree of country’s openness to trade, both the 
proxies used to measure human and physical capital and population growth have a positive 
impact on real GDP per capita growth, whilst the inflation rate and the ratio of public debt 
over GDP exert a negative effect16. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
The results reported in Panel A in Table 1 support the existence of an asymmetric effect 
between debt accumulation and debt reduction over growth, since the negative coefficient 
on the former (-0.35 on average) is, in absolute values, always higher than the negative 
coefficient on the latter (-0.16 on average), suggesting that the negative marginal effect of 
an increase in debt exceeds the positive marginal impact of a debt relief17. However, this 
asymmetric effect clearly differs between countries. The difference between the two 
marginal impacts ranges from a value of -0.46 in the case of Ireland to one of -0.03 in the 
case of Finland; Ireland, France, Germany, Portugal and Belgium are the countries where 
the asymmetry is higher. Interestingly, we do not find clear differences in patterns between 
central and peripheral countries, since the decrease in the absolute value of the marginal 
impact in the case of debt reduction varies within each group of countries and its average is 
-0.2 in both cases.  
As can be seen in Panel B in Table 1, the estimated models seem to pass diagnostic tests 
such as normality of error term, second-order residual autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity (χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H respectively). The overall regression fit is satisfactory, 
as measured by the adjusted R2 value (ranging from 0.5069 for Austria to 0.6991 for Spain). 
Finally, if we focus on the marginal impact of a debt reduction over growth in peripheral 
countries − where some countries (Portugal, Ireland and Greece) received financial rescue 
packages conditional on fiscal austerity and the implementation of structural reforms, and 
                                                 
15 Following the usual practice, to test whether lagged variables are relevant and valid instrument, we initially examine the 
first-stage regression, checking sign, significance and plausible magnitude of the coefficients on the instrument. Given the 
“weak instrument” problem, we apply the "rule of thumb” of a t-stats bigger than 2 (at least 10). We then examine the 
“reduced form” regression, checking that for the sign and magnitudes of coefficients. Finally, since we have more than 
one instrument, we test validity/exclusion restrictions using the Sargan (1958)’s test.   
16 As pointed out in Section 4.1, a positive effect was expected for the variables measuring openness to trade and physical 
capital, while a negative effect was expected for the ratio of public debt. However, according to the literature the expected 
effect of human capital, population growth and inflation rate might either be positive or negative. 
17 Note that an estimated negative coefficient for ΔdtI(Δdt<0) suggests a positive impact on growth, since such negative 
coefficient is multiplied by a negative number.  
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others (Spain) received financial assistance to recapitalize its banks with conditions on 
implementing structural reforms –, we see that, precisely in these four countries, this 
impact presents very low values (-0.18, -0.10, -0.05 and -0.05 in Portugal, Ireland, Greece 
and Spain, respectively), highlighting that the effect of austerity policies for boosting 
economy in those countries is limited.  
These results are in accordance with most of the recent literature which has studied 
whether the consolidation of public finances in the euro area through the reduction of 
fiscal expenditures and an increase in taxes contributed to GDP growth. Dreger and 
Reimers (2016) point out that the lack of public investment may have restricted private 
investment and thus GDP growth. Fatás and Summers (2016) provide support for the 
presence of strong hysteresis effects of fiscal policy, suggesting that attempts to reduce 
debt via fiscal consolidations have very likely resulted in a higher debt-to-GDP ratio 
through their long-term negative impact on output. Jordà and Taylor (2016)’s estimates 
indicate that in a slump austerity generally prolongs the pain, much more so than in a 
boom.  
Some of the literature has focused its analysis on the peripheral countries hit harder by the 
crisis. Aldici et al. (2016) look at the feasibility of the fiscal adjustment comparing the 
macroeconomic conditions in each country and emphasizing the role of the fiscal 
multipliers in the process. Their results also point to the slump in investment as the key 
negative factor behind the collapse in demand in all cases. Moreover, they suggest that one 
of the reasons why the recession was particularly deep in Greece was that the fall in 
investment was not even partially offset by higher exports, in contrast to Portugal and 
Ireland. Anderson et al. (2014) contend that structural reforms in core countries could be 
expected to offset the near-term negative impact on activity arising from the required fiscal 
consolidation. However, for the periphery, their results suggest that it would take several 
years before structural reforms could return the level of output to its pre-consolidation 
path. Inspecting the adjustment programs in place during the past few years in Portugal, 
Reis (2015) concludes that if success is assessed as making another debt crisis unlikely in 
the near future, the program delivered; however, if instead it is judged in terms of a 
rebound of the economy from its prolonged depression, then there is little to celebrate. 
Finally, Rosnick and Weisbrot (2015), who focus on the Spanish economy, find that the 
data do not support the thesis that the current economic recovery is the result of a return 
of market, consumer, and investor confidence due to fiscal consolidation; for them, a more 
likely explanation is a slowdown and possibly even the end of fiscal consolidation, 
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combined with more favourable external factors. These authors corroborate our results 
that fiscal consolidation in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain barely affected economic 
recovery. 
5.4. Identifying threshold effects  
Identifying a threshold effect for each economy under study would inform policy makers 
of the presence of a country-specific tipping point, which would be useful information for 
guiding macroeconomic policies and fiscal adjustments. To this end, we use the following 
alternative specification: 
1 1 2 3 4 5
* *
1 2( ) ( )
t t t t t t t
t t t t t
g g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF
d I d d d I d d
φ δ δ δ δ δ
γ γ ε
−= + + ∆ + ∆ + +
+ ∆ ≤ + ∆ > +
   (5) 
where I is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the condition is fulfilled (i. e., if td  
is either below or above a specific threshold value d*) and zero otherwise18. Again, the 
indicator function has the effect of splitting the debt change variable into two, allowing for 
its impact to differ depending on whether de debt ratio is below or above a given tipping 
point.  
Following the common practice in the empirical literature, the assignment to one or the 
other regime is determined by the debt-to-GDP ratio, allowing us to compare our results 
with previous papers which have adopted this ratio as the primary variable of interest. We 
evaluate all possible values for *,d selecting for each country the value that minimizes the 
sum of squared residuals from the regression as the relevant one19. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
We apply the 2SLS estimator proposed by Caner and Hansen (2004) using lagged terms of 
regressors as instruments. The results in Panel A in Table 2 show the debt-to-GDP 
threshold beyond which a debt increase starts to be detrimental for growth. It is striking 
that we do not find a common debt threshold in the EMU countries under study: it differs 
notably from country to country, ranging from 61% in Belgium to 21% in France. 
Furthermore, with the exceptions of Belgium (61%) and Germany (55%), the average value 
of the debt threshold is higher in peripheral (48%) than in central countries (41%). 
However, the average negative marginal impact of a debt increase beyond that point on 
                                                 
18 Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Baum et al. (2013), among others, use the same indicator function to capture thresholds 
effects.   
19 We also explored the possibility of multiple thresholds, but the data was unable to identify a second significant 
threshold during the sample period.   
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growth is much higher in central (-0.59) than in peripheral countries (-0.24). Therefore, 
these results suggest that with the exceptions of Belgium and Germany, peripheral 
countries have a little more room to increase their public indebtedness than central ones 
before it starts to have a detrimental effect on growth. Furthermore, beyond the tipping 
point the harmful effect of a debt increase on economic performance is much higher in 
central than in peripheral countries which may explain “the debt intolerance” exhibited by 
some core EMU countries20.  
All in all, the average threshold (44%) for the eleven countries under study is much lower 
than the figure obtained in the literature for euro area countries by means of panel data 
techniques. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) find that, between 1970 and 2008, the 
turning point was 90-100% of GDP, while Baum et al. (2013), who focused on the 1990-
2010 period, detected a similar threshold (95%) using a dynamic approach. The different 
results should be assessed with due caution and should be examined in the context of the 
distinct methodological approach implemented in this paper, since we adopt a times series 
analysis instead of a panel data approach and we deal appropriately with the different order 
of integration of the relevant variables, using changes in debt-to-GDP ratio as the primary 
variable of interest.   
However, in our view, our results are much more consistent than the ones just mentioned 
with the Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP)21 debt ceiling of 60% of GDP. Otherwise, if 
the tipping point (beyond which government debt negatively affects growth) was 90-100% 
of GDP, what would be the justification for requiring governments, under penalty of fines, 
to reduce their debt ratios if they surpassed the 60% reference value? Still, the accuracy of 
the fiscal limits included in the SGP has been surrounded by considerable controversy in 
the literature, and there is no agreement on its efficiency.  
In an empirical study of whether it pays off (in terms of economic growth) to fulfil the 
convergence criteria on the public budget and participation in the euro area, Bökemeier and 
Clemens (2016)’s results show that growth is higher if the debt-to-GDP ratio is below 60%. 
Similarly, Checherita-Westphal et al. (2014) estimate that euro area governments should 
maintain a debt-to-GDP target of 50% if they wish to maximize growth. However, other 
                                                 
20 As can be seen in Panel B in Table 2, the regressions fit reasonably well, as they pass the diagnostic tests against non-
normal errors, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.   
21 The revised Stability and Growth Pact (European Economy, 2011) includes the clause that if the fiscal position falls 
short of the Medium-Term Objectives (MTOs), countries must implement more ambitious adjustment plans in order to 
meet them. In addition, for countries with debt ratios above 60% of GDP, an excessive deficit procedure can be launched 
if the debt ratio is deemed not to be decreasing at a satisfactory rate – meaning that the debt ratio must diminish annually 
by at least 1/20th of the difference between the actual debt ratio and 60% of GDP reference value. 
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authors consider that a profound reform of the SGP is needed to make it work in the 
future. Ioannou and Stracca (2014) present evidence that the SGP has had no significant 
beneficial impact on the fiscal and economic performance of euro area countries; while 
Teulings (2016) shows that an episode of increased dynamic inefficiency, like the one 
driven by the Great Recession and the increased financial volatility, would require a higher 
debt level than those considered in the SGP. 
In this context, the conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis at this point are also 
mixed. On the one hand, in all the countries under study but Belgium, a debt increase 
begins to have detrimental effects on growth well before the SGP debt ceiling, meaning 
that fiscal policies should stay within a safe zone (i.e., a debt ratio of around 50% and 40% 
in peripheral and central countries respectively) below the official fiscal limit. So, with 
average debt levels of 100% in euro area countries, deleverage (austerity policies) should be 
applied; but, according to our results, debt reduction exerts barely any significant beneficial 
impact on euro area countries’ economic performance. Therefore, in our view, adjustment 
programmes should be accompanied by structural reforms that might increase the 
adjustment capacity or the potential GDP in euro area countries (see Aldici et. al. 2016). 
Otherwise, after years of experience with fiscal austerity which have reaffirmed its 
ineffectiveness as a primary instrument of debt reduction, according to other authors (see 
Mody (2013), among them) the current policy dilemmas might only be solved in a 
framework that allows orderly debt restructuring. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that in eight out of the 11 countries in our sample (Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), the years when the 
detected thresholds ratios are recorded coincide with the minimum value of the index of 
the fiscal stance proposed by Polito and Wickens (2012, 2014). This suggests that after a 
severe worsening of fiscal policy, an additional increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio would 
not stimulate economic growth. This reading is consistent with the claim made in Polito 
and Wickens (2012) that the main causes of fluctuations in their index are variations in the 
gap between expenditures and revenues. 
5.5. Comparing results  
In order to compare the results obtained from the asymmetric model and the threshold 
model, we perform stochastic dynamic simulations of the estimated models to assess how 
each explanatory variable contributes to the explanation of the average growth rate of real 
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per capita GDP during the 1981-2015 period.  Table 3 reports the results for each country 
under study22. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
As can be seen, the absolute value of the average negative contribution of a debt increase 
to growth is similar (-0.2) in the asymmetric and the threshold model. However, while in 
the asymmetric model the average negative contribution is somewhat higher in central 
countries (-0.3) rather than in peripheral ones (-0.2), in the threshold model the average 
negative contribution does not change between the two groups of countries.    
To compare the two models further, we perform dynamic multi-step forecasts of gt. within 
the sample using previously forecasted values of gt, and evaluate these forecasts based upon 
the model with the actual data. Table 4 shows the forecasting performance of our 
competing models. We evaluated their forecasting performance using five different 
measures of forecast accuracy: The Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), the Mean Absolute 
Error (MAE), the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), and two Theil Inequality 
coefficients (U1 for forecast accuracy and U2 for forecast quality). These statistics all 
provide a measure of the distance of the true from the forecasted values.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that in most of the countries the threshold model 
reports higher forecast accuracy. The exceptions are Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands, 
where the asymmetric model presents better forecast quality jointly with Germany and 
Finland, where both the threshold and the asymmetric model seem to be just as good. 
Therefore, when analyzing the contribution of a debt increase in economic growth (Table 
3), we will rely on the results obtained from the threshold model in the case of Belgium, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain; while in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands, we 
will use the results from the asymmetric model. In the case of Germany and Finland, we 
will take both into account. In Finland, the negative contribution of a debt increase to 
growth is very similar in both models (-0.18 and -0.20). However, in Germany, in absolute 
terms, the contribution is higher in the asymmetric model (-0.45) rather than in the 
threshold one (-0.22). Therefore, the average negative contribution of a debt increase in  
euro area countries economic performance is slightly higher when using the value from the 
asymmetric model in these two countries (-0.3 compared to -0.2, if the value from the 
                                                 
22 To save space, we only comment on the results for variations in the debt-to-GDP ratio.   
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threshold model is used). Moreover, while the average negative contribution of a debt 
increase in euro peripheral countries’ growth is -0.2, it ranges from -0.25 until -0.29 in 
central countries depending on the value used in Finland and Germany.  
Focusing on the behaviour of the contribution of a debt increase to economic growth 
within each group of countries (central and peripheral), we do find important differences. 
France, Germany, Belgium and Finland are the central countries with the highest negative 
contribution of a debt increase (their values range from -0.85 to -0.2), while the 
Netherlands and Austria have the lowest (-0.02 and -0.005 respectively). In the case of 
peripheral countries, Ireland, Italy and Portugal are the ones with the highest negative 
contribution (-0.34, -0.34 and -0.18), while in Greece and Spain it is significantly lower (-
0.10 and -0.06 respectively).  
Even though we agree that it is imperative to lower public debt over time, these results, 
combined with those displayed in Table 1, reinforce the idea that European policymakers 
need to be aware that the effect of debt on economic performance differs according to 
EMU country, as does the effect of fiscal adjustments on growth prospects. Therefore, we 
think that the pace of adjustment should differ between countries. In particular, according 
to our results, the five peripheral countries under study should be split in three groups with 
regard to the implementation of policy measures. The first would include Spain and 
Greece, Portugal would be the sole member of the second, and the third group might be 
formed by Italy and Ireland.   
In Spain and Greece, not only is the debt threshold above 50% (close to 60% in the Greek 
case), but the negative contribution of a debt increase to economic growth is also very low. 
In Portugal public debt reaches its tipping point at a lower value (close to 40%) but the 
negative contribution of higher sovereign indebtedness to economic performance is still 
small (-0.18). Finally, in Italy and Ireland the debt threshold ranges from 40% to 50% and 
the negative contribution of a debt increase is high (-0.34).  
Consequently, in the Greek and Spanish cases (whose economies have been severely hit by 
the crisis), our findings suggest that the pace of fiscal adjustment should be lower than in 
the other three countries. However, in Ireland and Italy (the countries with the highest 
detrimental effect of a sovereign debt increase on growth) a faster fiscal adjustment should 
be applied. Besides, in order to support growth when fiscal policy is tightened, we also 
agree that there is a need for reforms in goods, service, and labour markets to improve 
economic efficiency and boost potential growth, thus serving as important tools in the 
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fiscal adjustment process. Policies enhancing both stability and growth are possible in the 
EMU; some of them have already been implemented, and others are at an advanced stage 
of development. 
5.6. Robustness check 23 
Given that the sample period includes the inception of the EMU in January 1999, we 
conduct robustness checks by splitting the sample before and during EMU in order to 
examine whether the introduction of the fiscal discipline rules that came along with the 
common currency might have influenced the relationship between a debt change and 
economic growth from that date. The estimated coefficients for a debt change in the two 
periods corresponding to the asymmetric and the threshold model are shown in Tables 5 
and 6, respectively. 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 around here] 
The estimation results shown in these tables remain robust across both models, being once 
again the coefficients on debt variations statistically significant with the same sign, 
confirming the presence of asymmetric and threshold effects before and during the EMU. 
As can be seen in Table 5, when we compare the marginal impact on growth of debt 
accumulation and relief, before and after the beginning of the monetary union, the Wald 
test of significant differences in the estimated coefficients shows that the null hypothesis of 
no difference between pre-EMU and EMU coefficients associated with debt accumulation 
( 1ˆβ ) is rejected at the 1% significance level in Germany and at the 10% significance level in 
Ireland and the Netherlands, while there is no statistically significant difference between 
pre-EMU and EMU coefficients associated with debt relief ( 2βˆ ) except for Ireland and 
Italy (at the 5% significance level), and for Finland (at the 10% significance level).  
Moreover, in all the above cases but Ireland, the marginal impact of a debt change 
decreases with the introduction of the euro, suggesting that the fiscal discipline associated 
with the Stability and Growth Pact and the Excessive Deficit Procedure had somewhat 
mitigated the capacity of fiscal policies to influence economic growth. As said, Ireland 
seems to be an exception since the negative effect of a debt accumulation on economic 
growth is higher during the EMU period than before the introduction of the common 
currency.  
                                                 
23 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis. 
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Regarding the threshold model24, the Wald tests in Table 6 indicate that the marginal 
impact of a debt change on economic growth is only statistically different in the two 
periods at the 10% level in Germany above the determined tipping point (55% which is 
reached in 1995). Concretely, in that country, again the negative marginal impact of a debt 
increase beyond the threshold decreases with the introduction of the euro.  
All in all, the results from this robustness check suggest that the fiscal discipline and the 
multilateral surveillance of budget positions that were introduced with the inception of the 
EMU have moderated the impact of fiscal policies on economic growth, but only to some 
extent [as contend by Ioannou and Stracca (2014) or Teulings (2016), among others], since 
the coefficient estimates of both asymmetric and threshold models do not reveal 
statistically significant differences for most of the countries under study, given further 
support to the findings in the previous sub-sections.   
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we propose a new approach to analyse the debt-growth nexus, a relationship 
which has spawned a multitude of studies using a wide range of methodologies and 
conclusions. The previous work rests largely on the results from panel data studies, but we 
argue that more can be learned from appropriate time series analyses for individual 
countries in order to record their heterogeneous experiences. In doing so, we do not 
discount the importance of the panel data approach, which has some relevant theoretical 
implications; rather, we question the way in which these results are presented, and indeed 
the way in which they are used by policymakers. 
Therefore, this paper builds upon the existing literature studying the effect of public debt-
to-GDP ratio on economic growth, focusing on the time series dimension of the issue to 
obtain further evidence based on the historical experience of 11 EMU member countries 
during the 1961-2015 period to detect potential heterogeneities in the relationship across 
the euro area. As in every empirical analysis, the results must be treated with some caution 
since they are based on a set of countries over a certain period and on a given econometric 
methodology. This is particularly true of the comparison of the results with those of 
previous papers, since we adopt a time series analysis instead of a panel data approach, and 
                                                 
24 Note that, during the EMU subsample, only for Ireland and Spain there are observations where the debt-to-GDP ratio 
is below the estimated threshold *( ).td d≤  Therefore, we can only test the null hypothesis Pr1 1ˆ ˆe EMU EMUγ γ− =  for these two 
countries. 
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since we use changes in debt-to-GDP ratio as the primary variable of interest instead of the 
level of debt-to-GDP ratio25.   
The results presented in this paper should be of value to macro-prudential policymakers, as 
they provide evidence that in all the countries under study (with the exception of Belgium) 
a debt increase begins to have detrimental effects on growth well before the SGP debt 
ceiling is reached, meaning that fiscal policies should stay within a safe zone (a debt ratio 
around 40% and 50% in central and peripheral countries respectively) below the official 
fiscal limit. So, with average debt levels of 100% in euro area countries, deleverage 
(austerity policies) should be applied, but according to our results debt reduction does not 
exert any significant benefit on euro area countries’ economic performance. Therefore, in 
our view, adjustment programmes should be accompanied by structural reforms able to 
increase the adjustment capacity or the potential GDP in euro area countries. Otherwise, 
the current policy dilemmas might only be solved (see Mody, 2013) in a framework that 
allows orderly debt restructuring.  
Moreover, since our results provide support for the idea that the harmful impact of debt 
on growth does not occur beyond the same debt ratio threshold and with the same 
intensity in all EMU countries, a focus on average ratios and impacts may be misleading for 
the definition of policy in individual countries. This is especially true in an environment in 
which some EMU countries must already apply adjustment plans that re-establish 
competitiveness and fiscal balance. Specifically, our findings suggest that the pace of fiscal 
adjustment should be lower in Greece and Spain than in the other three peripheral 
countries. 
Finally, our findings may also provide useful inputs for further research since, as Coase 
(1988, 71) states “the inspiration is most likely to come through the stimulus provided by 
the patterns, puzzles and anomalies revealed by the systematic gathering of data, 
particularly when the prime need is to break our existing habits of thought”. Concretely, in 
view of the encouraging results of the present study, an extension of the present research 
might explore which are the channels (e.g., the equilibrium real interest rate, the sovereign 
risk premium or the expected future tax rates, among them) that drive the debt-growth 
relationship. Although this analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper, due to its 
relevance, it is in our near future research agenda.   
                                                 
25 To the best of our knowledge, there is no any previous study which has yet examined the statistical property of the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio series and taken into consideration its stationarity property in the analysis of the debt-growth 
nexus.   
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                                    Appendix 1: Definition of the explanatory variables and data sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Real growth rate (gt) Growth rate of real per capita GDP (annual %)   World Development Indicators (World Bank), 
extended to 2015 using  World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
Level of Output (yt) Per capita Gross domestic product at 2010 market prices AMECO, extended to 2015 using  World 
Economic Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio (dt) Ratio of net public debt to GDP AMECO and International Monetary Fund 
Population growth (POPGRt) Population growth (annual %) World Development Indicators (World Bank),  
extended to 2015 using World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
GCF-to-GDP ratio (GCFt) Ratio of gross capital formation to GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Human capital (HKt) Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Openness (OPENt) Absolute sum of exports and imports over GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank),  
extended to 2015 using  World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
Inflation (INFt) Growth rate of GDP deflator (annual %) World Development Indicators (World Bank),  
extended to 2015 using  World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
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      Figure 1. Sovereign Debt-to-GDP and GDP per capita growth evolution in EMU countries: 1961-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Note. Source AMECO and WDI 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al 
GD
P p
er
 ca
pit
a g
ro
wt
h
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
BELGIUM
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  -10
-5
0
5
10
15
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al 
GD
P p
er
 ca
pit
a g
ro
wt
h
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
FINLAND
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al 
GD
P p
er
 ca
pit
a g
ro
wt
h
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
FRANCE
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al G
DP
 pe
r c
ap
ita
 gr
ow
th
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
GERMANY
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al G
DP
 pe
r c
ap
ita
 gr
ow
th
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
THE NETHERLANDS
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al 
GD
P p
er
 ca
pit
a g
ro
wt
h
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
IRELAND
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al G
DP
 pe
r c
ap
ita
 gr
ow
th
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
ITALY
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  -10
-5
0
5
10
15
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al  
GD
P p
er 
cap
ita
 gr
ow
th
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
GREECE
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al 
GD
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 g
ro
wt
h
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-
GD
P
PORTUGAL
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al 
GD
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 g
ro
wt
h
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-
GD
P
SPAIN
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth  
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Re
al 
GD
P p
er
 ca
pit
a g
ro
wt
h
Pu
bli
c D
eb
t-t
o-G
DP
AUSTRIA
Public Debt-to-GDP Real GDP per capita growth
Table 1: Asymmetric model estimation results 
 
Panel A: Estimation results 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
gt-1  0.3559
*  
 (3.0788) 
0.1870** 
(2.5262) 
 0.1073 * 
 (2.8123) 
0.3912*  
(3.5921) 
0.0742**  
 (2.5679) 
0.3480* 
(2.7614)  
0.2401**  
(2.4153)  
0.3559*   
(3.0331) 
0.2898** 
(2.3412) 
0.2708**  
(2.3516) 
0.6603*  
 (3.0222) 
INFt -0.0652
* 
(-2.9961) 
-0.0106** 
(-2.4834) 
-0.0161** 
(-2.3312) 
-0.0688** 
(-2.3550) 
-0.1253** 
(-2.2652) 
-0.1799** 
(-2.6431) 
-0.1262* 
(-2.8015) 
-0.0359** 
(-2.3328) 
-0.0777** 
(-2.4357) 
-0.1074** 
(-2.5315) 
-0.0386* 
(-2.8881) 
ΔHKt 1.6174
** 
(2.3552) 
0.3891** 
(2.4215) 
0.8188* 
(2.7420) 
0.8502* 
(3.8110) 
0.5722** 
(2.3291) 
6.0990**  
 (2.3261) 
3.1679 
(2.3716) 
0.3697** 
(2.4171) 
0.1124** 
(2.3232) 
1.3625** 
(2.4571) 
0.7463* 
(2.8221) 
ΔOPEN t 0.2495
*  
 (3.2762)  
0.1166* 
(3.4623) 
 0.3001*  
(3.3361) 
0.1827* 
(2.4207) 
0.3193*  
 (3.9825)  
 0.0679** 
(2.4801) 
0.0347 
(2.6916) 
0.3259* 
(2.8812) 
0.0998* 
(2.8415) 
0.0652* 
(2.7661) 
0.2256** 
(2.4551) 
POPGROt 
0.8097** 
(2.3115) 
2.2881** 
(2.5923) 
3.1118* 
(2.7812) 
0.5730* 
(2.5134) 
0.3691* 
(2.6681) 
1.5568** 
(2.3341) 
0.1370 
(2.3527) 
1.3890** 
(2.3862) 
1.2397** 
(2.3281) 
1.4770* 
(2.9188) 
0.9190** 
(2.5662) 
GCFt 
0.5343** 
(2.4962) 
0.1312* 
(3.8324) 
0.1661* 
(4.1012) 
0.0564* 
(3.2123) 
0.0755** 
(2.4618) 
0.4923** 
(2.3516) 
0.2046 
(2.8801) 
0.1319* 
(3.1715) 
0.7081* 
(3.2661) 
0.1396* 
(4.2320) 
0.0810** 
(2.4617) 
ΔdtI(Δdt>0) -0.1457
** 
(-2.5634) 
-0.2408* 
(-2.6921) 
-0.5437* 
(-4.5723) 
-0.6297* 
(-2.5815) 
-0.4169** 
(-3.3752) 
-0.1010** 
(-2.5171) 
-0.5607 
(-4.7312) 
-0.4481* 
(-2.7143) 
-0.2516* 
(-2.6661) 
-0.3996* 
(-3.7512) 
-0.1507** 
(-2.5810) 
ΔdtI(Δdt<0) -0.0864
** 
(-2.3998) 
-0.0309** 
(-2.3042) 
-0.5154** 
(-2.2314) 
-0.1813* 
(-2.3551) 
-0.0772** 
(-2.3684) 
-0.0533** 
(-2.5215) 
-0.1018 
(-2.6017) 
-0.3263* 
(-2.6551) 
-0.1249** 
(-2.4345) 
-0.1847** 
(-2.6222) 
-0.0456** 
(-2.3516) 
  
Panel B: Model Diagnostics                        
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Adjusted R2 0.5066 0.5699 0.6628 0.6362 0.6311 0.5993 0.6759 0.6516 0.6714 0.6315 0.6991 
DW Test 2.3432 2.3579 2.4382 2.2609 2.4112 2.3516 2.2541 2.2603 2.2412 2.4211 2.3722 
χ2N  1.8019 [0.4062] 
2.6446 
[0.2663] 
3.1147 
[0.2107] 
1.5031 
[0.4717] 
0.3633 
[0.8339] 
3.2498 
[0.1969] 
1.6654 
[0.4349] 
1.6246 
[0.4438] 
1.2961 
[0.5231] 
0.4881 
[0.7843] 
1.1778 
[0.5599] 
χ2SC 0.7221 [0.6972] 
0.6737 
[0.5991] 
0.6935 
[0.7070] 
2.3360 
[0.3110] 
0.4703 
[0.8231] 
0.5918 
[0.7439] 
0.7039 
[0.7033] 
3.2015 
[0.2017] 
1.9344 
[0.3802] 
0.3406 
[0.8434] 
3.4576 
[0.1775] 
χ2H 9.7357 [0.2841] 
6.7833 
[0.7457] 
6.6370 
[0.5763] 
5.3963 
[0.6117] 
6.4655 
[0.4973] 
2.6931 
[0.9521] 
8.7579 
[0.2707] 
7.3818 
[0.4961] 
10.3646 
[0.2404] 
4.8097 
[0.7777] 
10.5802 
[0.2266] 
  
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by Newey and West (1987). 
 χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation 
and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. In the square brackets, the associated probability values are 
given. 
               * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
32 
 
Table 2:  Threshold model estimation results 
 
Panel A: Estimation results 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
gt-1  0.3648
* 
 (3.1862) 
0.0907* 
(2.8003) 
 0.0932*  
 (2.7241) 
0.3842*  
(3.7111) 
0.0942*  
 (2.7181) 
0.4042* 
(3.2924)  
0.3397*  
(2.7037) 
0.3736*  
(3.2115) 
0.3436* 
(2.8661) 
0.2879**  
(2.4514) 
0.6492*  
 (3.1016) 
INFt -0.0610
* 
(-2.9272) 
-0.0161** 
(-2.2725) 
-0.0278** 
(-2.6015) 
-0.0647** 
(-2.3243) 
-0.1662* 
(-2.6891) 
-0.1635** 
(-2.5342) 
-0.1133** 
(-2.4715) 
-0.0043** 
(-2.3451) 
-0.0380* 
(-2.6655) 
-0.0774** 
(-2.3771) 
-0.0434** 
(-2.3561) 
ΔHKt 1.7884
** 
(2.6473) 
0.1510** 
(2.3815) 
1.0678* 
(2.9711) 
1.3752** 
(2.3371) 
1.4776* 
(2.8560) 
4.5210*  
 (2.7027) 
6.2846* 
(3.1442) 
0.5810** 
(2.6261) 
0.2169** 
(2.3241) 
1.3216** 
(2.4241) 
0.7288** 
(2.3230) 
ΔOPEN t 0.2392
*  
 (3.1217)  
0.0981* 
(3.1434) 
 0.2838*  
(4.1922) 
0.1658** 
(2.3548) 
0.2855*  
 (3.6808)  
 0.0560** 
(2.4128) 
0.1218** 
(2.6525) 
0.3615* 
(3.2331) 
0.1057* 
(3.0910) 
0.1006** 
(2.3346) 
0.2405* 
(2.6919) 
POPGROt 
0.8572** 
(2.3587) 
2.5998* 
(3.1942) 
2.6089*** 
(2.5020) 
1.9275** 
(2.6321) 
0.3057** 
(2.4766) 
1.7582** 
(2.5006) 
0.2476** 
(2.5771) 
1.2511** 
(2.5927) 
1.4051* 
(2.7316) 
1.9496* 
(2.8416) 
0.8891* 
(2.5802) 
GCFt 
0.6005* 
(2.6678) 
0.1198* 
(4.6411) 
0.1600* 
(4.2623) 
0.0512** 
(2.3243) 
0.0549* 
(2.8793) 
0.4746** 
(2.3616) 
0.0911** 
(2.3711) 
0.0843** 
(2.6116) 
0.6847* 
(3.1671) * 
0.1278* 
(4.2111) 
0.0790** 
(2.6234) 
ΔdtI(dt>d*) -0.1778
* 
(-2.7815) 
-0.7263* 
(-3.7814) 
-0.7716* 
(-5.0371) 
-1.0077* 
(-3.6276) 
-0.6148* 
(-3.6115) 
-0.1502* 
(-2.9015) 
-0.3130* 
(-3.1051) 
-0.1786* 
(-2.7912) 
-0.2698* 
(-2.8334) 
-0.3773* 
(-4.2510) 
-0.1879* 
(-2.7711) 
ΔdtI(dt<d*) 0.0579
* 
(2.7145) 
0.1256** 
(2.4920) 
0.4932* 
(3.9631) 
0.1714** 
(2.4142) 
0.1959* 
(2.8436) 
0.2559* 
 (2.8771) 
0.2130* 
(3.8233) 
0.0648* 
(2.6818) 
0.1647** 
(2.5671) 
0.0485** 
(2.3516) 
0.0211** 
(2.2414) 
d* 
 
28% 
[1977] 
61% 
[1970] 
40% 
[1992] 
21% 
[1978] 
55% 
[1995] 
59% 
[1989] 
50% 
[1976] 
41% 
[1971] 
38% 
[1974] 
37% 
[1981] 
52% 
[1993] 
  
Panel B: Model Diagnostics                        
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Adjusted R2 0.5066 0.5644 0.6778 0.6706 0.6541 0.6021 0.6954 0.6567 0.6759 0.6379 0.7168 
DW Test 2.3432 2.3426 2.4117 2.2476 2.4415 2.3853 2.2678 2.2655 2.2541 2.4083 2.3421 
χ2N  1.68281 [0.4311] 
0.7051 
[0.6720] 
1.4800 
[0.4771] 
2.8600 
[0.2393] 
0.0537 
[0.9735] 
3.1281 
[0.1969] 
1.3685 
[0.5045] 
0.9928 
[0.6215] 
0.7728 
[0.6795] 
0.4881 
[0.7843] 
1.1778 
[0.5599] 
χ2SC 1.8910 [0.3885] 
2.5622 
[0.2777] 
0.6935 
[0.7070] 
1.0346 
[0.5961] 
0.4403 
[0.8024] 
0.8994 
[0.6378] 
0.5570 
[0.7569] 
3.1207 
[0.2101] 
2.8994 
[0.2353] 
0.2147 
[0.8982] 
4.1838 
[0.1235] 
χ2H 4.6661 [0.7926] 
6.7833 
[0.7457] 
8.9735 
[0.3445] 
5.3963 
[0.6117] 
9.0188 
[0.3407] 
6.3616 
[0.6068] 
9.0652 
[0.3368] 
11.3425 
[0.1830] 
12.1291 
[0.1455] 
5.0279 
[0.7546] 
8.5501 
[0.3817] 
  
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 d* indicates the estimated threshold in the debt/GDP ratio and, in the square brackets below them, we present the year 
when the threshold is reached.   
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by Newey and West (1987). 
 χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation 
and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. In the square brackets, the associated probability values are 
given. 
* and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Contribution of each explanatory variable to the growth rate 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
         Asymmetric model 
   gt-1 
INFt  
ΔHKt  
ΔOPEN t  
POPGROt 
GCFt 
           ΔdtI(Δdt>0) 
          ΔdtI(Δdt<0) 
      
      Explained 
 
0.0016 
-0.0005 
0.7171 
0.0040 
0.0082 
0.2733 
-0.0045 
0.0006 
 
2.1381 
 
0.1056 
-0.0108 
0.0183 
0.0502 
0.2102 
0.7456 
-0.1298 
0.0108 
 
2.2719 
 
0.0450 
-0.0132 
0.0322 
0.0424 
0.3765 
0.6363 
-0.2032 
0.0842 
 
2.5073 
 
0.5658 
-0.1778 
0.1257 
0.0806 
0.2347 
0.8484 
-0.7330 
0.0555 
 
2.1618 
 
0.1125 
-0.3927 
0.0886 
0.2588 
0.0644 
1.2937 
-0.4532 
0.0279 
 
2.0855 
 
0.0565 
-0.0522 
0.1013 
0.0034 
0.0716 
0.8304 
-0.0132 
0.0018 
 
2.1618 
 
0.1944 
-0.1380 
0.2010 
0.0185 
0.0303 
1.0688 
-0.4406 
0.0655 
 
3.2127 
 
0.2238 
-0.0492 
0.0257 
0.0615 
0.1541 
0.8669 
-0.3362 
0.0532 
 
2.0469 
 
0.0319 
-0.0212 
0.0009 
0.0082 
0.0501 
0.9412 
-0.0181 
0.0070 
 
1.9592 
 
0.2119 
-0.1262 
0.1152 
0.0147 
0.1120 
0.9263 
-0.2837 
0.0297 
 
2.9446 
 
0.4080 
-0.0466 
0.0432 
0.0469 
0.1638 
0.4568 
-0.0830 
0.0110 
 
2.5073 
   Threshold model 
   gt-1 
INFt  
ΔHKt  
ΔOPEN t  
POPGROt 
GCFt 
           Δdt(dt<d*) 
          ΔdtI(dt>d*) 
   
        Explained 
 
0.0015 
-0.0004 
0.7145 
0.0035 
0.0079 
0.2766 
0.0001 
-0.0036 
 
2.1886 
 
0.0617 
-0.0191 
0.0083 
0.0509 
0.2876 
0.8200 
0.0091 
-0.2191 
 
2.2672 
 
0.0448 
-0.0262 
0.0481 
0.0460 
0.3620 
0.7029 
0.0033 
-0.1810 
 
2.5081 
 
0.4573 
-0.1375 
0.1674 
0.0602 
0.6496 
0.6327 
0.0242 
-0.8539 
 
2.1536 
 
0.1510 
-0.5497 
0.2414 
0.2443 
0.0563 
0.9930 
0.0810 
-0.2173 
 
2.1127 
 
0.0733 
-0.0530 
0.0839 
0.0051 
0.0904 
0.8951 
0.0088 
-0.1016 
 
2.1652 
 
0.3202 
-0.1442 
0.4642 
0.0759 
0.0638 
0.5539 
0.0079 
-0.3418 
 
3.7336 
 
0.2513 
-0.0063 
0.0432 
0.0730 
0.1485 
0.5923 
0.0027 
-0.1047 
 
2.0817 
 
0.0406 
-0.0103 
0.0018 
0.0087 
0.0567 
0.9093 
0.0059 
-0.0127 
 
1.9385 
 
0.2094 
-0.0846 
0.1039 
0.0211 
0.1375 
0.7885 
0.0019 
-0.1778 
 
2.9631 
 
0.4058 
-0.0531 
0.0427 
0.0506 
0.1603 
0.4508 
0.0002 
-0.0573 
 
2.5370 
 
 
Observed 
 
2.3619 
 
2.2357 
 
2.5387 
 
2.1517 
 
2.0488 
 
2.1517 
 
3.7567 
 
1.9941 
 
2.0417 
 
2.9489 
 
2.5387 
 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 The contributions are normalized to 1. 
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Table 4: Forecast accuracy  
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
         Asymmetric model 
 
RMSE 
MAE 
MAPE 
SMAPE 
Theil´s U1 
Theil´s U2 
 
 
 
1.6822 
1.2728 
245.7643 
68.9455 
0.3014 
0.4092 
 
 
1.4986 
1.1977 
107.4667 
64.2291 
0.2680 
0.3261 
 
 
1.7829 
1.4308 
228.8803 
60.9822 
0.2322 
0.5765 
 
 
1.3404 
1.1123 
118.2404 
65.9260 
0.2476 
0.8058 
 
 
1.3729 
1.0684 
128.8657 
64.9815 
0.2526 
0.6856 
 
 
3.4865 
2.7963 
224.1046 
93.0946 
0.4214 
0.8778 
 
 
2.1692 
1.6385 
80.2761 
66.1567 
0.1950 
0.2470 
 
 
1.9725 
1.6361 
183.8302 
82.3025 
0.3397 
0.2457 
 
 
1.3721 
1.1049 
63.3426 
68.3219 
0.2584 
0.5860 
 
 
2.3637 
1.9034 
194.9332 
71.5568 
0.2714 
0.5292 
 
 
1.9586 
1.5217 
98.0630 
75.5680 
0.2922 
0.5312 
         Threshold model 
 
RMSE 
MAE 
MAPE 
SMAPE 
Theil´s U1 
Theil´s U2 
 
 
 
1.7144 
1.3341 
274.6975 
68.6044 
0.3069 
0.3883 
 
 
1.3415 
1.0917 
98.7810 
57.7618 
0.2351 
0.4181 
 
 
1.7637 
1.4445 
226.2982 
62.4967 
0.2297 
0.6191 
 
 
1.2649 
1.0925 
108.1447 
67.3532 
0.2312 
0.7518 
 
 
1.3267 
1.0988 
131.18176 
60.7439 
0.2377 
0.8515 
 
 
3.4515 
2.6898 
239.1299 
83.9547 
0.4052 
0.9860 
 
 
1.9649 
1.6428 
152.8034 
63.4062 
0.1742 
0.1375 
 
 
1.9945 
1.6918 
224.6151 
80.6154 
0.3561 
0.3945 
 
 
1.5905 
1.2960 
88.5590 
75.0829 
0.3021 
0.6890 
 
 
2.3166 
1.8343 
175.5161 
70.7161 
0.2533 
0.4181 
 
 
1.8654 
1.4344 
91.5161 
64.617 
0.2671 
0.4366 
 
 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 RMSE is the Root Mean Square Error, MAE is the Mean Absolute Error, MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 
Theil’s U1 is the Theil Inequality coefficient of forecast accuracy, and Theil’s U2 is the Theil Inequality coefficient of 
forecast quality. Bold values indicate the forecast that performed the best under each of the evaluation statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Asymmetric model: Pre- EMU and EMU estimation analysis 
 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
 
Pre-EMU 
Pr
1ˆ
e EMUβ −  -0.0912
**  
 (-2.8521) 
-0.1837** 
(-2.6412) 
- 0.7750*  
 (-2.7671) 
-0.6873*  
(-2.9212) 
-0.5771*  
 (-2.6719) 
-0.3347* 
(-2.7721)  
-0.5045*  
(-2.7411) 
-0.5892*   
(-2.7612) 
-0.4527* 
(-2.7356) 
-0.3869  
(-2.7223) 
-0.1683*  
 (-2.7544) 
 Pr
2
ˆ e EMUβ −  -0.0393
* 
(-2.9151) 
-0.0885** 
(-2.5716) 
-0.6005** 
(-2.6512) 
-0.1068* 
(-2.6616) 
-0.1810** 
(-2.6155) 
-0.0994* 
(-2.6812) 
-0.2291* 
(-2.8312) 
-0.4766* 
(-2.6574) 
-0.2441* 
(-2.6671) 
-0.1351** 
(-2.6515) 
-0.0526* 
(-2.8112) 
 
EMU 1ˆ
EMUβ  -0.2485
** 
(-2.5512) 
-0.2888** 
(-2.5613) 
-0.8632** 
(-2.7817) 
-0.3863* 
(-2.8615) 
-0.1331* 
(-2.5667) 
-0.3229*  
 (-2.7662) 
-0.7365* 
(-2.7262) 
-0.3800* 
(-2.7132) 
-0.1236* 
(-2.7761) 
-0.4209* 
(-2.7659) 
-0.1334* 
(-2.8231) 
 
2
ˆ EMUβ  -0.1695
*  
 (-2.7412)  
-0.2199* 
(-2.7671) 
 -0.3018*  
(-2.7771) 
-0.0775* 
(-2.6551) 
-0.0603*  
 (-2.8235)  
 -0.0429* 
(2.6761) 
-0.0134* 
(-2.6566) 
-0.1530* 
(-2.8278) 
-0.0578* 
(-2.8145) 
-0.1701* 
(2.8113) 
-0.0370* 
(-2.7548) 
 
Differences in  
coefficients 
Pr
1 1
ˆ ˆe EMU EMUβ β− =  0.0911 [0.7628] 
0.8694 
[0.3511] 
0.0793 
[0.7783] 
1.5980 
[0.2062] 
7.9275* 
[0.0049] 
0.0009 
[09757] 
2.8860*** 
[0.0894] 
0.2566 
[0.6125] 
3.4028*** 
[0.0651] 
0.0295 
[0.8636] 
0.0124 
[0.9113] 
 Pr
2 2
ˆ ˆe EMU EMUβ β− =  0.3876 [0.5336] 
0.2891 
[0.5908] 
3.6572*** 
[0.0558] 
0.0616 
[0.8040] 
0.8127 
[0.3673] 
0.0997 
[0.7522] 
5.4691** 
[0.0194] 
5.2223** 
[0.0225] 
0.0709 
[0.7900] 
0.0006 
[0.9811] 
0.0191 
[0.8902] 
 
Notes:  
1ˆβ and 2βˆ are, respectively, the estimated coefficients capturing in equation (4) the effects on economic growth of positive and negative debt variations. 
In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by Newey and 
West (1987).  
Wald tests are Chi-square test statistics for significant differences in estimated coefficients. In the square brackets, the associated probability values are given. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 6:  Threshold model: Pre- EMU and EMU estimation analysis 
 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
 
Pre-EMU 
Pr
1ˆ
e EMUγ −  0.0823
* 
(2.8434) 
0.1035* 
(2.6876) 
0.4572* 
(2.7656) 
0.1301* 
(2.7769) 
0.2610* 
(2.9122) 
0.2046* 
(2.8142) 
0.1827* 
(2.8551) 
0.0262* 
(2.7671) 
0.1880* 
(2.9162) 
0.0480 
(2.8112) 
0.0228* 
(2.8661) 
 Pr
2ˆ
e EMUγ −  -0.1823
*  
 (-2.7761) 
-0.6140* 
(-2.7767) 
-0.8708* 
 (-2.8273) 
-1.0449* 
(-2.8762) 
-0.9881*  
 (-2.8655) 
-0.2403* 
(-2.7884)  
-0.4914*  
(-2.7991) 
-0.3218*   
(-2.8431) 
-0.2706* 
(-2.8342) 
-0.3519 
(-2.7861) 
-0.2079*  
 (-2.7781) 
 
EMU 1ˆ
EMUγ           
  
 
0.2070* 
(2.7761)    
0.0335* 
(2.7882) 
 
2ˆ
EMUγ  -0.1380
* 
(-2.7856) 
-0.8604* 
(-2.8243) 
-0.8165**  
(-2.8456) 
-1.2790* 
(-2.9541) 
-0.6321*  
 (-2.8555) 
-0.1059* 
(-2.9341) 
-0.3729* 
(-2.8661) 
-0.3074* 
(-2.8442) 
-0.1706* 
(-2.9541) 
-0.2939 
(-2.7984) 
-0.1268* 
(-2.8771) 
 
Differences in  
coefficients 
Pr
1 1ˆ ˆ
e EMU EMUγ γ− =        0.4280 [0.5130]    
0.0223 
[0.9620] 
 Pr
2 2ˆ ˆ
e EMU EMUγ γ− =  0.1457 [07027] 
0.8319 
[0.3617] 
0.0686 
[0.7933] 
0.2717 
[0.6022] 
3.0918*** 
[0.0787] 
0.5818 
[0.4456] 
0.1621 
[0.6873] 
0.0167 
[0.8972] 
0.3323 
[0.5643] 
0.1088 
[0.7416] 
0.3742 
[0.5407] 
 
Notes:  
1ˆγ and 2γˆ are, respectively, the estimated coefficients capturing in equation (5) the effects on economic growth of debt variations below or above the detected threshold value. 
During the EMU subsample, only for Ireland and Spain there are observations where *,td d≤ so we can only test the null hypothesis 
Pr
1 1ˆ ˆ
e EMU EMUγ γ− = for these two countries. 
In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by Newey and 
West (1987).  
Wald tests are Chi-square test statistics for significant differences in estimated coefficients. In the square brackets, the associated probability values are given. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
